【完整註解】台灣、中國，與台積電
TSMC 作為全球最大的半導體製造商，若落入中國之手，中國得以控制世界經濟。美國新聞網站Semafor也曾在 2023年3月的報導中寫道，若中國成功入侵台灣，美國將摧毀台灣先進的半導體產業，「美國及其盟友永遠不會讓那些工廠落入中國手中」。不過本文的作者 David Sacks 卻對此計畫懷有疑慮，他認為毀滅台灣的半導體製造設施(fabs) 不僅不必要，可能還會造成反效果。
Taiwan, China, and TSMC
閱讀前你該知道的事
TSMC 作為全球最大的半導體製造商，若落入中國之手，中國得以控制世界經濟。美國新聞網站Semafor也曾在 2023年3月的報導中寫道，若中國成功入侵台灣，美國將摧毀台灣先進的半導體產業，「美國及其盟友永遠不會讓那些工廠落入中國手中」。不過本文的作者 David Sacks 卻對此計畫懷有疑慮，他認為毀滅台灣的半導體製造設施(fabs) 不僅不必要，可能還會造成反效果。
Planning to destroy Taiwan’s fabs is unnecessary and discussing such a possibility is counterproductive.
閱讀前你該知道的詞彙
semiconductor 半導體
semi 半、部分
conductor 導體
manufacture 「製造」
fab 半導體製造廠
politics 政治
deter (v.) /deterrence (n.) 威懾
閱讀全文 >> Threatening to Destroy TSMC Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive
In recent years, some have advocated that the United States should plan to destroy Taiwan’s semiconductor fabrication facilities (or “fabs” in industry speak) both to deter a Chinese assault and to ensure that China does not inherit Taiwan’s semiconductor industry if deterrence fails and China successfully annexes Taiwan. Such an idea, however, overstates the importance of semiconductors in cross-strait dynamics and reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the semiconductor industry. A policy of destroying the heart of Taiwan’s economy would also help China sow distrust among Taiwanese people toward the United States and undermine Taiwan’s will to resist Chinese aggression.
deter (v.) /deterrence (n.) 威懾
cross-strait dynamics 兩岸關係
cross-strait 海峽兩岸
dynamics 互動、關係
sow 播種。sow seeds 就是「播下種子」，文中用sow distrust 意思就是「播下不信任的種子」
近年來，有些人主張美國應該計劃摧毀台灣的半導體製造廠（業界又稱為“fabs”）來威懾中國的攻擊，並確保如果威懾失敗而中國成功吞併(annex)台灣時，中國不會繼承台灣的半導體產業。然而，作者 David Sacks 認為這種想法過分強調(overstates) 半導體在兩岸關係(cross-strait dynamics)中的重要性，並顯示出對半導體行業的誤解 (misunderstanding)。David 認為這種摧毀台灣經濟核心 (heart) 的政策也會幫助中國在台灣人民中播下對美國的不信任 (distrust) 種子，並削弱 (undermine) 台灣抵抗中國侵略的意志 (will)。
台積電TSMC 的市場占比
Taiwan dominates the production of semiconductors, with its companies holding 68 percent of global market share, while Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces around 90 percent of the world’s leading-edge semiconductors. These chips provide computing power for everything from smartphones to weapons and cars, many of which require thousands of chips to function.
Although American companies design the world’s leading chips, the United States lacks the capacity to produce cutting-edge chips and is dependent on chips manufactured in Taiwan. U.S. fabs produced 37 percent of the world’s chips in 1990, but this number fell by nearly two-thirds to 13 percent by 2010. Losing access to Taiwanese chips would cause many of the biggest U.S. companies, from Apple to General Motors, to struggle to produce anything.
leading-edge / leading / cutting-edge 都有「先進的」、「高端」的意思
capacity 這裡指「能耐、能力」
access 「取得、使用某東西的權限或能力」
Ex. After the incident, he no longer has full access to the company's database. 經過這次意外，他再也沒有公司資料庫的無限權限。
台灣主宰半 (dominates) 導體的生產，其公司佔有 (hold) 全球市場的 68％，而台積電 (TSMC) 更是生產約90％世界最先進的半導體。這些芯片為各種產品提供計算能力(computing power)，從智能手機到武器和汽車等，其中許多產品甚至需要數千個芯片來運作 (function)。
儘管是美國公司負責設計這些芯片，但美國缺乏 (lacks) 生產高端芯片的能力，只能依賴 (dependent on) 台灣。美國的半導體工廠在1990年生產了全球37％的芯片，但到2010年這一數字下降了近三分之二(two thirds)，降至 13％。若是無法取得台灣芯片，許多美國最大的公司，從蘋果(Apple)到通用汽車(General Motors)將難以(struggle) 生產任何產品。
存在的風險
To be sure, reliance on a single place (and in some instances even a single building) for computing needs is a significant vulnerability. That these fabs are located on an island prone to earthquakes, one that China has vowed to bring under its control, by force if necessary, is cause for concern. Some fear that if China were to annex Taiwan and take control of these fabs, it could cut off chip exports to the United States and use the world’s most advanced chips to turbocharge its military modernization.
vulnerability 弱點; weakness
prone to ... 容易... （一般是用於不好的事情）
turbocharge 促進、推動、增強
turbo 是「渦輪」，俚語中意思就是「強大」的意思。turbocharge 有「大力增強」的感覺
Modernization 「使更現代化、更高科技」
文中 military modernization 指「軍事的發展、進步」
當然，依賴單一地點（有時甚至依賴單一建築物）來供給全世界的運算需求是一個巨大的 vulnerability。這些半導體製造設施位於一個容易地震的島嶼上，一個中國曾發誓 (vowed) 要以必要的手段將其納入自己的控制之下的島嶼，這是十分令人擔憂的。有些人擔心，如果中國吞併 (annex) 台灣並控制這些半導體製造設施，中國將可以切斷 (cut off) 往美國的芯片出口，並使用他們製造出來的先進芯片來加速軍事發展 。
Recognizing this vulnerability, the United States in recent years has taken steps to reshore some semiconductor manufacturing capacity: the Trump administration encouraged TSMC to open a fab in Arizona, while in 2022 Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which provides $52.7 billion to jumpstart domestic semiconductor manufacturing.
jumpstart 「啟動」（一般用於透過外接電池來快速啟動引擎，像是車子沒電而用另一台車的電池來啟動那樣）
意識到這項弱點 (vulnerability)，近年來美國已採取措施 (take steps)，重新在把半導體製造能力 (capacity) 遷回自己國內。川普政府(Trump administration) 鼓勵台積電在 Arizona州設立製造工廠(fab)，同時在2022年，國會通過了CHIPS和Science法案，提供了527億美元的資金來啟動國內 (domestic) 半導體製造。
最壞的打算
他們在論壇中到底講了什麼？這裡有完整的談話內容（已翻譯成中文），看完後會更好理解下面的段落。
Some analysts believe this is still not enough: Taiwan’s fabs are simply too important, they argue, to risk them falling into China’s hands. Instead, the United States or Taiwan should make clear that they would destroy Taiwanese fabs during a conflict.
一些學者認為這仍然不夠：他們認為台灣的半導體製造設施實在是太重要了，不能冒險 (risk) 讓它們落入中國手中。他們認為美國或台灣應該明確表示 (make clear) ，在爆發衝突 (conflict) 時他們將摧毀台灣的半導體製造設施。
A 2021 paper published in The U.S. Army War College Quarterly argued that the best way to deter Chinese aggression was for the United States and Taiwan to “lay plans for a targeted scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain. This could be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.”
render ..A.. ..(形容詞).. 使得 A (形容詞)
Ex. The accident rendered the couple unconscious. 車禍使這對情侶(couple) 沒有意識。
2021年發表在 The U.S. Army War College Quarterly（美國陸軍戰爭學院季刊）上的一篇論文主張，阻止 (deter) 中國侵略的最佳方法是讓美國和台灣 制定一個針對性的焦土政策，使台灣在被武力占領 (seized) 時不只變得不再是美麗的島嶼，而且維護 (maintain) 成本相當昂貴。其中最有效的方法就是威脅摧毀 TSMC 的設施。
Former U.S. national security advisor Robert O’Brien recently resurrected this line of thinking, advocating for destroying Taiwan’s fabs and comparing such a move to Britain’s decision to sink France’s naval fleet after the country surrendered to Nazi Germany.
前美國國家安全顧問 (advisor) Robert O'Brien 最近又重新提出了這種想法，主張 (advocate) 摧毀台灣的半導體製造設施，並將這一策略與英國在法國投降給納粹德國後決定沉沒法國海軍艦隊 (naval fleet) 的決定比較。(在二戰期間，在法國投降(surrender) 後，為了防止法國海軍艦隊落入德國手中，法國政府於1940年6月27日下令擊沉在土倫的軍艦基地。)
作者的論點 1 - 半導體產業對兩岸關係沒那個重要
Such analysis vastly overstates the importance of semiconductors to the decision-making of China’s leadership. China’s desire to control Taiwan predates semiconductors and its determination to achieve this political objective would be just as strong if Taiwan were a poor, agrarian society. If China chooses to use force against Taiwan, it will do so having accepted the economic costs and consequences. Thus, the prospect of inheriting TSMC is unlikely to drive China to use force, while the prospect of taking over an island with a destroyed semiconductor industry is unlikely to restrain Beijing. A plan to eliminate Taiwan’s fabs will not bolster deterrence.
文中 vastly overstates 指「過分高估，差太多了」
predates 早於... comes before
bolster 支持、支撐; support
這種分析過分高估了 (overstates) 半導體對中國做決策的影響。首先，中國早在台灣半導體產業興起前就想控制台灣。即使台灣是一個貧窮的農業 (agrarian) 社會，中國實現這個政治目標的決心依然同樣堅定。如果中國選擇對台灣使用武力，它也會做好付要出經濟成本和面對後果的打算。因此，繼承台積電的前景 (prospect) 不太可能是促使中國使用武力的動力，而一個半導體產業被摧毀的島嶼也不太可能會牽制 (restrain) 北京。 這項計劃不會有威懾 (deterrence) 的效果。
作者的論點 2 - 討論要摧毀台灣半導體只會幫助中國
Second, discussion of destroying Taiwan’s most famous industry and the source of much pride among Taiwanese is a gift to Chinese Communist Party propagandists, who have sought to weaponize this discourse.
Ex. His son is his source of pride. 他兒子令他引以為傲
propagandist 「宣傳者」
propaganda 政治宣傳
discourse 「言論」。文中提到 weaponize this discourse 意思就是說把考慮摧毀台灣半導體的這些言論化成武器，利用它來達到對中共有利的政治宣傳。
第二，討論要摧毀台灣最著名，最引以為傲的產業反而對中國的宣傳者有利。
（他們會利用這些言論來達到對中共有利的政治宣傳。）
In February 2023, Chinese state media accounts began discussing the Biden administration’s alleged “plan for the destruction of Taiwan.” The following month, China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang rhetorically asked, “Why does the U.S. keep on professing the maintenance of regional peace and stability, while covertly formulating a ‘plan for the destruction of Taiwan’?”
2023年2月，中國官方媒體帳號開始討論拜登政府(Biden Administration) 所謂的“摧毀台灣計劃”。次月，中國國務委員兼外交部長秦剛 (Qin Gang) 反問道，「為什麼美國一直宣稱 (profess) 維護地區的 (regional) 和平與穩定，卻暗中制定了一個‘摧毀台灣計劃’？」
After O’Brien made his comments and subsequently received an award from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson commented, “Honoring such an individual shows that [Democratic Progressive Party] authorities do not mean it when they say they love Taiwan. The truth is they have been selling Taiwan away.”
在O'Brien 發表評論並隨後 (subsequently) 獲得台灣總統蔡英文頒發獎項後，中國外交部發言人也評論說到，「表彰 (honor) 這樣的個人，表示民進黨不是真正的愛台灣，事實是，他們一直在出賣台灣。」
China is using this opening to spread the narrative that the United States is not a trustworthy partner, that U.S. and Taiwanese interests are not aligned, and that the United States views Taiwan as a pawn in a larger geopolitical contest with China.
aligned 一致的、對齊的
文中用來指「想法、目標一致」
pawn 棋盤上的「兵」「卒」「棋子」
中國正在利用這個機會來帶動風向，散播「美國不是一個值得信賴的夥伴」、「美國和台灣的利益不一致」、「美國只是將台灣視為在與中國的政治競爭中的棋子」這類的言論。
This is a boon to Beijing’s long-term strategy of chipping away at the confidence of the Taiwanese people, in the hope that the Taiwanese public will support political leaders who favor negotiated acquiescence to its political demands. The notion that one needs to destroy Taiwan in order to save it is also likely to undermine the willingness of Taiwanese people to resist.
acquiescence 默許、不情願地同意、妥協
Ex. His silence was seen as acquiescence to the proposal, even though he had not formally agreed. 他的沈默被視為對計劃的妥協，即使他並沒有正式同意
這根本是送給北京的禮物，幫助中國削弱 (chip away) 台灣人民的信心，希望台灣大眾支持會對中國政策妥協的政治領袖 (political leaders)。為了拯救台灣而摧毀台灣的想法也會削弱 (undermine) 台灣人民抵抗 (resist) 中國的意願 (willingness)。
作者的論點 3 - 不用摧毀也能防止產業落入中國手中
Third, and most importantly, destroying Taiwan’s fabs is unnecessary because the United States could render them inoperable to the PRC (People's Republic of China) without even using physical force.
第三，也是最重要的一點，其實沒有必要 (unnecessary) 毀掉台灣的芯片廠 fabs，因為美國不需要使用武力就能使這些製造廠在中國 (中華人民共和國)手上無法運作 (inoperable)。
The facilities need continued access to U.S. and allied technologies and equipment to function, and if China were to gain control over Taiwan, the United States could simply bar U.S. companies from providing the necessary support.
bar ..A.. from (doing...) 禁止 A 做...
這些 fabs 需要有美國和盟國 (ally) 的技術和設備才能運作，如果中國獲得對台灣的控制，美國可以直接地禁止美國公司提供必要的支援。
As Chris Miller details in Chip War, “U.S. companies like Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA are part of a small oligopoly of companies that produce irreplaceable machinery, like the tools that deposit microscopically thin layers of materials on silicon wafers or recognize nanometer-scale defects. Without this machinery—much of it still built in the U.S.—it’s impossible to produce advanced semiconductors.” Lacking access to U.S. machinery, the semiconductor firms China would inherit would be unable to maintain existing equipment, much less keep pace with their competitors in an industry characterized by rapid advances.
這裡指有少數幾家科技公司壟斷了整個芯片市場
silicon wafer 「矽晶圓」，半導體材料
defect 「缺陷」
正如 Chris Miller 在 Chip War 一書中所說，「像 Applied Materials、LAM Research和 KLA 等美國公司是其中幾個寡占芯片市場的公司，他們生產不可取代的機器設備，比如在矽晶圓(silion wafers)上塗上薄層材料的設備，或檢測奈米級 (nanometer-scale) 缺陷的工具。如果沒有這些在美國製造的機器，就不可能生產先進的半導體。」少了美國的機械設備和支援，中國將繼承 (inherit) 的台灣半導體公司也將無法維護現有的設備，更不可能在這個快速 (rapid) 前進的行業中跟上 (keep pace) 其他的競爭對手。
Concern about over-reliance on Taiwan for the majority of the world’s chips and nearly all of the most advanced chips is warranted. To address this vulnerability, the United States should do more to rebuild its domestic semiconductor industry: ensuring that the funds provided through the CHIPS Act are used effectively, reforming its immigration system to enable talented engineers to stay in the country, and building a pipeline of engineering talent that can work on semiconductor manufacturing. Planning to destroy Taiwan’s fabs, however, is unnecessary, and discussing such a possibility is counterproductive.
pipeline 字面上是「水管、管子」的意思
這裡指「一系列的流程，或機制」，為了快速、有效的大量生產或處理某事物
過度依賴 (over-reliance) 台灣來提供芯片的擔憂是合理的。為了解決這個弱點 (vulnerability)，美國應該更多地重建其國內的 (domestic) 半導體產業，確保通過CHIPS法案提供的資金 (funds) 被有效使用，改革 (reform) 其移民體制使得優秀的工程師能夠留下，並建立體制大量培養出能參與半導體製造的人才。計劃摧毀台灣的半導體製造設施是不必要的 (unnecessary)，可能還會造成反效果 (counterproductive)。